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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2331 
LA.URA HEFLIN, Appellant, 
versus 
E. G. HEFLIN, Appellee. 
PETITION F'OR A!N APPEAL AND 
SUPERSEDEAS. 
To the Honorable Chief JitStice and Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Laura Heflin, who was the complainant 
in the Trial Court, respectfully represents that she is ag-
grieved by a final decree and judgment of the Corporation 
Court of Fredericksburg·, Virg-inia, entered on the 1st day of 
May, 1940, in a proceeding in Chancery wherein your peti-
tioner was the complainant and E. G. Heflin was the respond-
ent. 
A transcript of the record is submitted herewith from which 
it will be observed that the Honorable Frederick W. ·Cole-
man, the Trial Judge, filed an elaborate opinion, which is in-
accurate and the conclusions drawn therein are illogical in 
many respects, which will be pointed out in this .petition. 
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STATE.MENT OF THE CASE. 
Complainant filed her bill against respondent in the Cor:-
poration. Court of Fredericksburg at the First November 
2• '"'Rules, 1927, praying that she be allowed alimony and 
. counsel fees, but not asking for a divorce; alleging that 
on October 8, 1906, she and respondent were married and 
lived together as husband and wife in Fredericksburg until 
seven or eight years prior to the institution of the suit, though 
they lived in the same home in which the mother and sister 
of the respondent resided; alleging that she wanted to live 
with her husband in a separate home. and apart from her 
mother-in-law and sister-in-law, but seeing· that such an ar-
rangement might bring about friction in the family, sh.e did' 
not pursue this wish but did her part to. make her husband 
a good wife; that seven or eight years prior to the :filing of 
the bill her husband severed all marital relations, without 
reason or justification. The bill further lists the large hold- -
ingE;; of real estate in Fredericksburg, running into many thou-
sands of dollars, and further large holdings of personal prop-
erty, in the aggregate approaching nearly one-quarter of a 
million dollars, and further alleging that petitioner helped her 
husband during· the married period to earn and accumulate 
these holdings; that she herself had no property of any conse-
quence in her own name. 
The bill further alleg·ed that the respondent abandoned 
and deserted petitioner; that he became infatuated by other 
women and under circumstances as to be extremely embar-
rassing to petitioner; that she tried to bear this witl10ut 
3• complaint, *thoug·h she suffered humiliation and mental 
anguish by reason of such conduct; that her husband ad-
vised her he wanted a divorce and intended l1aving one; that 
petitioner informed him she desired no divorce, which seemed 
to irritate her husband, whereupon he became abusive, call-
ing her an "old hussy'' or similar expressions, and ordered 
her out of the home, stating she wasn't wanted there; that 
the mother-in-law indicated she did not wish petitioner to 
leave the home, though ordered to do so by her husband; 
that petitioner remained in the home, thoug·h unhappy as she 
was, until about two weeks prior to the filing· of the bill, at 
which time respondent stated to petitioner that either he him-
self or she would have to g·et out, and the mother-in-law told 
petitioner that under the circumstances either one or the other 
would have to leave and get out, and indicated that she could 
not do without her son and wished him to remain. There-
fore, petitioner was ordered from her home and compelled 
to leave and to seek shelter elsewhere. She sought refuge in 
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the home of her brother and niece in Fredericks burg, but was 
without means · of securing maintenance, !ood, clothing and 
shelter, and became dependent upon the charity of her kin. 
And further alleges : 
'' That she herself is without maintenance and support and 
is without means or funds by which to employ and pay coun-
sel for representing her in this predicament, and that she is 
entitled to have the same furnished and afforded her by her 
said husband, who to all intents and purposes seems to have 
abandoned your Oratrix. '' 
4 • * And praying: 
"That the court direct the said E. G. Heflin to pay unto 
her suitable, reasonable and appropriate maintenance for a 
home, food, clothing·, and for the necessaries of life, and that 
she is entitled to have such commensurate with her standing 
in the community in which she lives and commensurate with 
the financial status of her said husband, and that she be al-
lowed, not only maintenance and alimony, but that she also 
be allowed sufficient funds to maintain this suit and to em-
ploy and compensate counsel for representing her.'' 
Upon maturity of the bill,. ,November 26, 1927, the Court 
entered an order requiring ventlente lite the respondent to 
pay complainant $250.00 monthly and $350.00 on account of 
counsel fees. Respondent paid this monthly allowance for 
some time, and then would allow it to accumulate until it 
became a considerable amount. However, he did finally catch 
up in the payments until within the past two years or more 
respondent declined to make further payments. Thereupon 
complainant filed her petition in this cause, setting forth the 
failure of respondent to comply with the terms of said order 
and asking that he be dealt with for contempt and that a re-
ceiver be appointed to collect rents from the real estate, etc., 
and that he be required to pay the amounts in arrears. Pro-
cess issued on the petition and respondent filed his written 
motion to dismiss said suit and to vacate the said decree in 
which he was re(JUired to pay alimony, alleging the follow-
ing: 
1. "That a.Court of Equity has no jurisdiction as set forth 
in the bill of complaint, because the exclusive original juris-
diction of such matters was at the time vested in the Juvenile 
and Domestic Hela tions Court. "" • * '' · 
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2. "That a Court of Equity was without either potential 
or active jurisdiction to award alimony pendente lite or coun-
sel fees, and that the order entered on November 26, 1927, is 
the ref ore void.'' 
5• ~3. '' That the remedies provided by statute ( See Code 
Sections 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 
1944, 1944A and Sections 1953A, et seq.), are adequate and 
complete for all domestic relations cases except those involv .. 
ing divorce." · 
4. "That Domestic Relations Courts were created for the 
purpose of hearing and deciding all cases arising out of Do-
mestic Relations, and the exclusive original jurisdiction of all 
such cases was according·ly vested in such courts by statute." 
Briefly stated, the position taken by respondent is that an 
Equity Court cannot entertain a bill for alimony without a 
prayer for a divorce, or petitioner has to proceed in the 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts under Sections 1936 
and 1937 A of the Code. 
After elaborate argument, both verbal and written, the 
learned Trial Judge filed a written opinion, which is made a 
part of the record in this case, reaching the conclusion that 
in Virginia : 
1. Equity ne,~er had jurhidiction to entertain a suit for 
alimonv. 
2. Tiiat petitioner was required to do one of two things; 
either sue for a divorce and in that proceeding be awarded 
maintenance or alimony, or proceed in the Juvenile and Do-
mestic Relations Court; 
and entered the decree of May 1, 1940, to this effect, and va-
cated and annulled the order of November 26, 1927, and va-
cated the judgment and ordered the Clerk to make notation 
to this effect in the Judgment Lien Docket where said judg-
ment w·as docketed. 
6* * ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. The Court erred in holding that in Virginia Equity never 
had jurisdiction to entertain a suit for alimony. 
2. The Court erred in holding that complainant could not 
~;o into a Court of Equity for her maintenance or alimony un-
less Rhe sued for a divorce. 
3. The Court erred in holding· that inasmuch as complain-
nnt did not sue for a divorce that she had only one remedy 
and that she would he compelled to go into the Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations Court for relief. 
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4. The Court erred in dismissing complainant's bill and in 
cancelling and annulling the judgment, which aggregated in 
excess of $7,000.00. 
LAW OF THE CASE. 
1. The Court erred in holding that in Virginia Equity never 
had jurisdi~tion to entertain a suit for alimony. 
Petitioner contends that as far back as 1826, in the case of 
Almond v. Alniond, 4 Rand. (25 Va.) 662, a Court of Chan-
cery in Virginia inherently had jurisdiction to entertain suits 
for alimony in cases where the husband turns his wife out 
of doors without support, as was in this case. 
7* *This case arose in the ·Chancery Court of ~"'redericks-
burg. Judg·e Carr, ii:i delivering the opinion, gives the 
history of a suit for maintenance, known as a suit for ali-
mony. He says : 
"I believe that in practice the county courts sitting as 
courts of equity have assumed the power of giving separate 
maintenance in cases of separation, but by what rule they 
have been reg11lated, I )mow not. The jurisdiction was sus-
tained by the Chancellor of Richmond Chancery Court in 
Pitrcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & Munf. 507, and the reasoning of 
the Ohancel1or on the point of jurisdiction seems to me sound. 
If there be a contract for separation, it is conceded on all 
hands that equity might in proper cases enforce that con-
tract; but suppose a husband to turn his wife out of doors 
- or to treat her so cruelly that she cannot possibly live with 
him, suppose him to persevere in refusing to take her back 
or to provide a cent to feed and clothe her; surely in a civil-
ized country there must be some tribunal to which she may 
resort. She cannot be out of the protection of the law-an 
outcast dependent on the charity of the world while her hus-
band may have thousands and she may have brought him 
all. I would in such case unquestionably stretch out the arm 
of Chancery to save and protect her.'' 
So here we have the question of jurisdiction established 
in Virginia for suits for maintenance and support. So far 
as petitioner has been able to ascertain, this case has never 
been reversed. The learned Trial Court brushes this case 
aside by characterizing· it as obiter dictum. It is true that 
the decision of the court was against the aggrieved wife, but 
that was due to the fact that the prayer was for specific prop-
erty, and under the strict pleading· of the time relief was de-
nied. Judg·e Carr says: 
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'' The demand is not for alimony or for maintenance. gen-
erally, but that a judgment which the husband has recovered 
for a specific piece of property ( a negro woman) shall be 
enjoined and the wife quieted in the possession of that 
woman.'' · 
8* *But the Court dealt with the question involved here, 
and says: · 
"I have considered the case thus much at large because it 
. is entirely new in this court.'' 
This is braced by what Judge Staples said in Latham v. 
Latham, 30 Gratt. 338. It is upon this subject he says: 
'' Alimony is an allowance made to the wife out of the hus-
band's estate or income upon a decree of separation. In 
England and in some of the United States it is a mere inci-
dent to the divorce and is never allowed when the divorce is 
refused or even upon an independent bill for separate main-
tenance. The reason assigned is that it is against the policy 
of the law to make a separate judicial ·provision for the wife 
out of the husband's estate, to be expended apart from him, 
except in those cases where the separation is sanctioned by 
the eourts. In Virginia the statutes allow alimony as an in-
C}ident to a decree for a divorce.'' 
'' But this court. has g·oue further and held that equity has 
jurisdiction, in an independent suit, to decree in favor of the 
wife in proper cases, as for example, when she has been aban-
doned by the husband or driven from his house by his ill 
treatment and compelled to seek an asylum elsewhere.'' 
This would not indicate that Judge ,Staples, at least, felt 
that Judge Carr's conclusions were obiter dictimi. 
Judge Staples with approval quofos the very language of 
Judge Carr, in which he says: 
'' Surely in a civilized country there must be some tribunal 
to which she may resort. In _such a case a Court of Equitv 
would unquestionably stretch out its arms to save and pro-
tect her." 
He also cites P,urcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & :Munf. 507. So 
here we have it from Judge Carr and Judge Staples. 
Another eminent legal mind }las dealt Vlith this proposi-
tion. Vl e find this language : 
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9• *"In Virginia not only is alimony granted as inci-
dental to a divorce of either kind, with the larg·est dis-
cretion as to the estates of the parties, but it may be grantefl 
by the Court of Chancery independently of any divorce or any 
a.pplication for one, as where the misconduct of the husband 
drives the wife from her home or he turns her out of doors, 
or perhaps wherever a divorce from bed or board or a restora-
tion of conjugal rights would be decreed had they been asked 
for." 1 Minor's 1nstitutes, 4 Ed. 308. 
To. these eminent minds we add Judg·e Tucker, who, in 
Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & Munf. 507, says the proposition 
is sound. 
A.gain we find .the verdict of )fr. Justice Storey, who pro-
nounced it as "good sense and reason". 2 Eq. Jur., Se-c. 
1423A. 
And these· are not all. Mr. Justice Holt expressed him-
self on the proposition, and says : 
"In this Commonwealth, and indeed in most of the. states, 
divorces at early dates were by act of legislature, but courts 
of equity, at a time when they had no ~·eneral jurisdiction to 
grant them, asserted and exercised jurisdiction to decree ali. 
mony." Bray v. Landgren (Va., 1934), 172 S. E. 252. 
Mr. Justice Holts reflects his interpretation of what was 
decided in Purcell v. Purcell, and among other things says: 
'' But the power of courts of equity to decree alimony did 
not orig-inate in any statute. It is a power inherent in them. 
It had its origin in the legal obligation of the husband in-
cident to the marriage state to maintain his wife in a man-
ner suited to his means and social position." Bray v. Lande-
gren, supra. 
Again we find : 
'' Although courts of chancery would not assume jurisdic-
tion over divorces in the absence of direct authorization, they 
nevertheless held that. their general equity jurisdfotion must 
be deemed to include the right to award alimony in a proper 
case, inasmuch as ecclesiastical courts, to whieh such juris-
diction rightfully belonged at common law, had never 
10• *constituted a part of our judicial system. Their c011-
clusion was further strengthened by the fact that in Eng-
land during the Commonwealth the ecclesiastical c.ourts were 
abolished and in consequence thereof their entire jurisdiction 
in eases of alimony and of separate maintenance devolved as 
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a matter of course and necessity upon the court of chancery 
as the only tribunal fitted and competent to decide thereon.'' 
1 R. C. L., page 876, Section 14. 
And further we find : 
'' In a very decided majority of the states it is now the 
settled rule that the jurisdiction of the equity courts to 
a ward alimony is not merely incidental to suits for divorce 
or separation, but is inherent, and that alimony may be 
awarded in an independent suit therefor. The broad prin-
ciple upon which these authorities rest is that it is the duty 
of the husband to R11pport the wife, and if, without fault upon 
her part, he refus<:iR to do so, even though she does not seek 
or desire a Jegal f,:epin·ation or divorce, equity will compel 
him to render bClr a maintenance commensurate with his 
means, because of 1he inadequacies of the remedies available 
at law for its enforcement. While many jurisdictions for one 
reason or ariother have deemed it expedient to enact statutes 
in order to reach the same result., these authorities, being 
unhampered by a precedent, have squarely held that in the 
absence of statutory provision to the contrary, equity has in-
herent jurisdiction of such suits, because they involve those 
principles upon which the aid of chancery has been invoked 
from the earliest times. The mere fact that statutory pro-
vision has been made for awarding alimony when divorces 
are granted does not exclude by implication any jurisdiction 
the courts may have had to enforce the fulfillment of that ob-
ligation in an action independent of a proceeding for a di-
vorce. It can hardly be presumed that the legislature, while 
carefully providing for the continuance of the obligation of 
maintenance after divorce, intended thereby to cut off any 
jurisdiction which might be in the courts to enforce that ob-
ligation while the bonds of matrimony still existed. So to 
hold would mean that the obligation could only be enforced 
by first dissolving· the bonds of matrimony, a construction 
which would leave the law open to the charge that it was so 
framed as to encourage divorce; for the wife who kept faith 
with the marriage vows might be driven by privation in some 
cases at least to release the husband from the bonds of matri-
mony by applying· for a divorce in order to obtain relief from 
penury and want. Consequently, as the doctrine of separate 
maintenance clearly falls within the ordinary principles upon 
which the jurisdiction of equity rests, there is no rea-
11•x, son, *in the absence of a direct inhibition, for denying 
alimon;' under such circumstances.'' 1 R. C. L., pages 
879-80, Section 17. 
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'' The jurisdiction of an independent suit for alimony is 
1)ased on the grounds that such an action falls within the or-
dinary principle on which the jurisdiction of equity rests; 
that it does so fall is not open to dispute.,., 1 R. C. L., Section 
18, p. 880. 
Again we find this question squarely met in West Virginia 
in Lang v. Lang, 73 S. E. 716., 38 L. R. A. (N . .S.) 950 and note. 
The court deals somewhat with the history of the question : 
'' That the recognition of such jurisdiction has met the ap-
proval of most eminent minds, there can be no doubt. That 
the reasons for such recognition are sound is made clear by 
reading· of authorities. 
'' The broad grounds upon which these authorities rest is 
that it is the duty of the husband to support the wife, and 
if, without fault upon her part, he refuses to do so, the courts 
will compel him to render her a reasonable support in ac-
cordance with his means, even though the wife does not seek 
or wish a legal separation dissolving the bonds of matri-
mony, and that an action for this purpose may be maintained 
because of inadequacies of ordinary legal remedies to en-
force this duty. Again, the policy of courts is to discourage 
rather than encourage divorces. The wife may be entitled 
to a divorce, but whether or not she will exercise that right 
is optional with her, and to hold that unless she did, she could 
not maintain an action for support would be both unreason-
able and unjust, and although-the conduct of the husband may 
be such that she could dissolve the marriage contract, he is 
not relieved from his duty of supporting her because she does 
not wish to pursue that course." vV. Va., Lang v. Lang, 73 S. 
E. 716. 
How applicable is this to the case now before us .. 
"Our divorce statutes do not contain a word that either 
expressly or impliedly takes away the right of a wife to -sue 
for maintenance without divorce-a thing entirely different 
from the right to mere maintenance. The latter right belonged 
to a wife long before the divorce statutes were passed. How 
the granting of an entirely different right can exclude 
12* the exercise '1 of one already vouchsafed, we cannot 
readily conceive." Lan,q v. Lang, 73 S. E. 716. 
Ag·ain West Virginia dealt with the question in 1919 in the 
ease of Clifton v. Clifton, 98 S. E. 72. That case was exactly 
like tl1e one at bar, a pure bill by the plaintiff to secure her 
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maintenance and support from her husband independently of 
any relief by way .of ~ivoree. A demurrer. to the bill was 
overruled by the C1rcmt Court of the propriety of that rul- · 
ing certified to the appellate court for its decision, and here 
it was affirmed, holding· the demurrer was not good-a case 
exactly like the one before us, except the Trial Court in West 
Virginia reached a different conclusion from the learned 
Trial Court in this case. 
"It is insisted by the defendant that the court is without 
jurisdiction to entertain a bill by a wife against her h.usband 
seeking only maintenance and support and not praymg for 
divorce. The contention made is that the court only has juris-
diction to g-rant such relief as an incident to a divorce. ~ * :r.. 
It will not do to say that she may bring suit for a divorce and 
get support and maintenance as an incident to any relier 
g-ranted in such suit. She may not desire a divorce; in fact, 
the g-rounds may not be sufficient for the awarding of a di-
·vorce. It would be unjust and inequitable to force her to ac-
cept relief which she does not want in order to secure the re-
lief which she does desire and to which she is justly entitled.'' 
Clifton v. Clifton, 98 S. E. 72. 
In 1 R. C. L., page 903, Section 50, under the heading of 
"Independent suit for separate maintenance", we find: 
'' A woman who is compelled through her husband's fault 
to live apart from him may in many jurisdictions maintain 
a suit for ·separate maintenance or a permanent alimony 
without being forced to seek a divorce. In 8 such pro-
13• ceeding the court has power to award alimony pendente 
lite, even though the statute contains no express g-rant 
of authority to make such award except in the case of a suit 
for divorce.'' -
Citing 102 A. S. R. 710, 17 Am. Jr. 443, Section 555, in 
State v. Maxwell (1921, W. Ya.), 108 S. E. 418, case of man-
damus to compel alimony pendente lite w·hen suing for sepa-
rate maintenance, the court cites Mr. Story, 3 Eq., ,Tur. 14 
Ed., Section 1858, in which we find: 
''In America a broader jurisdiction in cases of alimony 
has been asserted in some of our courts of equity, and it ha·s 
been held that if a husband abandons his wife and separates 
himself from her without any reasonable support, the court 
of equity in all cases may decree her a suitable maintenance 
and support out of his estate, upon the very ground that there 
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is. no adequate or sufficient remedy ,at law !n su_ch a ca.se, 
and there is so much good sense and reason m this doctrme 
that it may .he wished it were generally adopted.'' 
And the court goes on further and says : 
.. · ... 
"From these authorities the plaintiff's right to such rea-
sonable .allowance seems clear.'' 
. . . 
. . ~ 
: Without prolonging this question further it appears that 
a wife· who has been wrongfully deserted by her husband 
and he fails to support her is entitled to : 
1. A suit in. equity .for alimony-maintenance and support; 
which is inherent to a court of equity. That this right. ex-
isfed.: prior to divorce suits, priQr to legislative enactments au-
thorizing courts to hear divorces. · · 
· · 2. If ·she desires a ·divorce, she can obtain in that proceed_. 
ing alimony-maintenance and support; which is inherent to 
a court of ·equity as to alimony and inci4ental and statutory 
as to the divorce statute. · 
14~ •2. The Court erred in holding that complainant could 
not go into a Court of Equity for her maintenance or 
alimony unless she sued for a divorce. 
_This holding puts a premium on divorce. It exacts of pe-
titioner the very thing which is against ·public policy, the ef-
fect of which is to require-of her, a good wife who is blame-
less; to either suffer the pangs of hunger on the :one hal).d, 
or on the other, to give to her husband, who is in the wrong, 
a divorce, something to which he is not entitled. This is the 
'~milk in the cocoanut" of this case. The respondent, who 
has plenty and being in the wrong and not in a position wh.ere . 
he; .. can obtain a divorce, is trying to coerce his wife to di-
vorce him; and starving her is the process to obtain this end. 
The ruling of the court aids him in this process. Can such 
be the lawf 
''·The jurisdiction of our courts of equity in divorce cases 
is statutory." Bray v. Landegreti, 172 S. E. 252. · 
Mr. Justice Holt further says· in this case: 
-,-, And in Code Section 5111, as amended by acts of-1927, 
E.xtra Session, C85, provisions are made for alimony, but 
they at·e not exlusive. In this Commonwealth, and indeed . in 
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most of the states, divorces at early dates were by act of leg-
islature, but courts of equity at a time when they had no gen-
eral jurisdiction to grant them asserted and exercised juris-
diction to decree alimony.'' 
15* •The Justice then goes back to 1810 to the case of 
Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & Munf. (14 Va.) 507): 
'' Ann Purcell, who was living apart from her husband, 
b1·ought an independent suit for alimony. The jurisdiction. 
of the court was challenged; the Chancellor said: 'If the. 
jurisdiction of this court were now to be settled upon English 
precedents, there might be some doubt about the question 
from the cases as bro_ught into view by Mr. Fomblanque, but 
I shall leave this clashing of English Justices to be reconciled 
among themselves and take up· the question upon first prin-
-ciples. I hold that in every· well regulated government there 
must aomewhere exist a power of affording the remedy where 
the law affords none, and this power belongs to a court of 
equity; and as a hu.sband and wife are considered ·as one in 
-law, it is evident that in this case the law can afford no remedy . 
.which is universally admitted to be a sufficient ground 
to give this court jurisdiction, and the ref ore it must enter-
tain a bill if there be sufficient proof of the marriage.'' 
He then goes into the history of the question and finds an-
other 1·eason, which he calls '' another appealing reason'' 
(citing 1 R. C. L., page 876) 1 and further he says: 
'' But the power of courts of equity to decree alimony did not 
odgfoate in any .~tatute. It is a power inherent in them. It 
had its orig·in m the legal obligation of a husband incident 
to the marrjage s~te to maintain his wife in a manner suited 
to his means and ~90ial position.'' : 
And further citing from a decision by the Supreme Court 
of the United States says: _ 
'' Alimony does not arise from any . business transaction 
but from the relation of marriage. It is not founded on con-
tract, expressed or implied, but on the natural and legal duty 
of the husband to support the wife. The general obligation 
.to support is made specific· by the decree of the court of ap-
propriate jurisdiction." Citing Audoban v. Shufeldt, 181 
U. S. 575, 45 L. Ed. 1009. 
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16·~ · •so here we have it that a court of equity has juris-
diction inherently to entertain a suit for alimony, a right 
which it exercised long before the divorce statutes. 
. These expressions cannot be lightly brushed aside as obiter 
dictum. -
With the aforegoing, petitioner is unable to understand how 
the learned Trial Court in_ its opinion could say: 
· ''It is quite m~nifest that the Cl:tancery .e.our.t never had 
inherent jurisdiction to entertain a bill for alimony without 
praying for a divorce." 
Yet the Purcell ·case, as far back as 1810, decides that .a 
court of equity inherently has jurisdiction. Again in .1826 
Judge Carr in Almond v. Almond, reaffirms this. Then to 
repeat, we have .Judge Staple~ in Latham v. ~atham, Pro-
fessor John B. M1Jior, Mr. Justice Holt., the Rµlmg Case Law, 
decisions by the Supreme Court of West Virginia, and manv 
others, holding contrary to the . ruling bY, the learned Trial 
Judge in this case. The ref ore, it is submitted that the second 
assignment of error is definitely shown. 
17* *3. The Court erred in holding that inasmuch as com-
plainant did not sue for a divorce that she had only one 
remedy and that she would be compelled to go into the J uven-
ile and Domestic Relations Court for relief. 
The statutes, Virginia Code, 1936, 1937 and 1937 A, et seq#, 
are criminal statutes. 
Section. 1936 provides for cases only where the wife· is· in 
destitute or necessitous circumstances, and the desertion of 
her by the husband under those conditions created a cr.hne,-a 
misdemeanor. 
Section 1937 provides how the proceedings ( under this. act) 
may be instituted: 
( a )-By a petition filed by the wife; 
(b )--Child; 
. ( c )-Any probation officer upon information; 
· {d)-By any other person having knowledge of the facts. 
It further p1·ovides that it is the duty of the Chief of Po-
lice, Sheriff, or Probation Officer in any City, Town or County, 
when in his opinion a person in his Jurisdiction is guilty of 
failure to support his family, to bring such person before the 
Court. 
Section 1937a says: "The proceedings under this section 
shall be 11ad, '' etc., and then provides ''·The juvenile and do-
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· mestfo relations court shall have exclusive original ju.:. 1s• risdiction 8 in: all cases arising under this act''; and fur-
ther provides, ''The person accused shall have the same 
right of appeaLas· provided by law in other similar cases" .. 
Observe, the wife has no appeal-:--only the person a9cused 
has such right. . 
What is meant by '' exclusive original jurisdiction in all 
cases arising under this act'' f 
The lang11age -~oes not say "in all cases im,olving deser-
tion or failure to support a wife or family'', nor does the act 
say that all previous remedies are wip~d out; but it simply 
says '' in all cases arising under this act''. 
· Remember, the act creates a misdemeanor only in those 
cases where the wife is in destitute or necessitous circum-
. stances. The common law made it the duty of the husband 
to maintain and support his wife, and she did not have to wait 
until she was in destitute and necessitous circumstances be-
fore sh~ could ask the aid of a court of equity where the hus-
band was derelict in his duty. 
· Judge Kelley, in Butler v. Com. (1922), 110 S. E. 868, which 
was a prosecution under Sections 1986 and 1937 of the Code 
of 1919, says ~ . 
'' The statute under which this prosecution was. instituted 
was not intended to change the common law with respect to 
the duty of a father to maintain and support his infant child, 
· but merely to more effectually enforce the legal duty.'' 
19• •Prior to the enactment of Sections 1936, et seq., the 
deserted wife could go into equity to -enforce mainte-
nance · and support as purely a eivil remedy, whether she 
wished a divorce, or whether she did not wish a divorce, but 
often the husband, without property, would desert the wife 
and family. Those who were deserted had nothing, were in 
destitute and necessitous circumstances, were helpless, were 
unable to reach the door of the chancellor. ,So the legislature 
came to their rescue, made such a desertion where the wife 
or child was in destitute or necessitous circumstances a crime 
-a misdemeanor. 
Observe, it did not make all desertions a ,crime, but only 
those where there was destitution or necessitous circum-
stances. 
At this time the police justices and justices ·of the peace 
had exclusive original jurisdiction of all misdemeanors (with 
a few specific exceptions), Acts 1904, p. 157: 
This was amended in 1910 Acts, p. 424, still retaining the 
provisions as to exclusive original jurisdiction. 
Acts 1915, p. 149, chapter 114, first passed what now is em-
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·braced 1n Section~ 1936, 1937, .-1937a, et seq., creating this 
additional crime-desertion of wife or child then and there 
being in destitute or necessitous circumstances-making it a 
misdemeanor and placed the jurisdiction where generally 
. other misdemeanors were; and this is buttressed by 
20"" what Judge eKelley, in Butler v. Com., 132 Va. 609, 110 
S. E. 868, says : 
'' The statute was not intended to change the common law, 
• • • but merely to more effectually enforce the legal duty.'' 
It will be seen that this is the explanation why the crime 
of the desertion of a wife or infant child then and there being 
in destitute or necessitous circumstances was placed in the 
.Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, which succeeded po-
lice justices and trial justices-a jurisdiction similar to other 
misdemeanors. -
Hence where the statute provides that where such court 
shall be established the juvenile and domestic relations court 
'' shall have exclusive original jurisdiction: in all cases arising· 
under this act''-that is in prose~utions for the crime. 
: '' Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases arising un-
der this act'' does not mean every case involving maintenance 
and support, and alimony. If it did, then the divorce courts 
woulc:J be relieved of dealing with. matters pertaining to main-
tenance and support, but no one will seriously contend for 
this. · 
The Virginia Court of Appeals, in discussing these statutes 
and Section 5107 (providing· for allowances for maintenance 
pendente lite) says: . 
''The two remedies are distinct, and ·a wife must elect which 
remedy she would pursue in" compelling a delinquent husband 
to provide her support.'' 
Wright v. ·wright, 164 Va. 245, 178 S. E. 884. 
21 * *This conclusively shows that the expression "e~-
clusive original jurisdiction in all cases arising under 
this act" does not mean in all cases involving maintenance 
and support, but simply means in all m;iminal prosooutions 
where the desertion is of the wife or child who then and there 
is in destitute or necessitous circumstances. 
Again, the statute provides for an appeal for the accused, 
but for ·no one else. So it would be absurd to say that the 
statute ,vas intended to cover all cases involving maintenance 
and support, forcing the complaining wife who has been de-
serted, into the juvenile and domestic relations court in a 
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oriminal prosecution, and, should that court decide in favor 
of the accused, would leave her high and dry with no right ()f redr'ess to any other court, but she would be bound by 
the decision of such a minor court as the juvenile and do-
mestic relations court. This would cut her off of her rights 
· and involve the validity of the .statute itself. · 
On the other hand the statute simply creates a crime for a 
husband to desert his wife or child, then and there in desti-
.tute Qr necessitous circumstances, and he is proceeded ag$inst 
just like in any other criminal case, except certain liberal 
.provisions are made by which the juvenile and domestic re-
1ations court can requite him to maintain and support those 
who are deserted and gives the accused the right of ap-
22* peal *just like any other criminal case; and all proceed-
ings under this statute are placed within the juvenile 
and domestic relations court; and this is the reason that the 
statute itself says '' shall have exclusive original jurisdiction 
in all cases arising under this act''. So with this construction 
the law is va,id, and is simply an additional remedy to those 
already existing. 
Furthermore, the following is obtained from the statutes: 
i-Crim.inal, and not civil; 
2-Requires proof as in criminal cases, beyond every rea-
sonable doubt_; · 
3-Are inadequate as to the remedy; 




d----.Any other person having knowledge of facts, 
e-Chief of Police, Sheriff, or Probation Officer. 
5-.Accused is g•iven an appeal, but not the plaintiff; 
6-Accused may have millions in property in Virginia and 
should he· disappear or g·o abroad, then the wife would have 
no remedy whatsoever, but would perish for the lack of a 
temedy, for the lack of means of enforcing her .rights. 
7-Embarrass the wife by coercing a criminal prosecution 
ag·ainst her husband contrary to her wishes, which would tend 
to promote and encourag·e permanent separation with 
23* no *hope of reconciliation. 
8----If the wife, having property, desert her husband 
he being penniless, no relief whatever is afforded him. ' 
Respondent relies on Com. v. ,Jernigan, 104 Va. 850, but 
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unfortunately the statutes as to desertion do not fit the defini-
tion of a civil injury; because the complaint is not sql~ly at 
the discretion of the injured party, nor of his or he:(tepre-
sentative, but at the instance, as stated, of · · 
l=-The wife; 
. 2-The child; 
3-Any probation officer upon information; 
4-By any other petson having knowledg.e of the facts; 
and further makes it the duty of the Chief of ~olice, Sheriff, 
or Probation Offi~er when a person in his .. jurisdiction is 
guilty of failure to support .his family, to bring su_ch person 
before the court. So the initiation of the proceeding is not 
confined to the discretion of the injured party, or his rep· 
resentative but on the other hand it may be pursued ''by 
the sovereign, or the subordinate of the sovereign''. There• 
fore, it is a crime. The statute, 1936, expressly says that the 
guilty person. 
'' Shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and on c.onvfotion 
thereof shall be punished by a. fine of not exceeding fi-ve hun• 
dred dollars, or in the case of a husband or father be sen-
tenced to the state convict toad force at hard labor for a pe-
riod of not less than ninety days nor more than twelve months, 
or both." 
24• ·Then it provides what might take place in lieu of 
such fine. 
So it may be said that the statute prescribes both punish-
ment and reparation. Therefore it does not fit the definition 
of a civil inJury. · · 
HISTORY OF SECTION 4106 OF THE CODE. 
The history of this section throws some light on the ex-
pression contained in Section 1937 a in which this language 
is used, '' Exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising 
under this act' '. 
Acts 1893-4, pag·e 430, gave rolice ·justices and justices of 
the peace '' concurrent jurisdiction'' with the county and cor-
poration courts of the State of all cases of assault and bat-
tery (not felonies), petit larceny, unlawful or malicious tres-
pass, and other misdemeanors therein enumerated, and fur .. 
ther provided that in any city in which there is a police jus-
tice, the powers and jurisdiction conferred by tliis section 
shall not be exercised by any other justice. The next session, 
Acts 1895-6, page 924, Section 4106 was changed, using this 
languag·e, '' shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all 
( '~·' . 
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misdemeanor cases occurring within their jurisdiction'', and 
further providing that the police justice shall try the cases. 
This was inade an emergency act. Nothing is said about giv-
ing a grand jury power to investigate misd~meanors or 
25• prefer indictments ,a.or presentments. The next session, 
. Acts 1897-8, page 289, again changed Section 4106, giv-
ing police justices and justices of the peace concurrent juris-
diction in ~e.rta,in misdemeanors, including violations of the 
revenue laws'_and certain other laws, and then provided: 
"shall have..e~clusive original jurisdiction for the trial of all 
other misdemeanor cases arising within their jurisdiction'', 
and further gave gTand juries power to investigate, indict 
or present in misdemeanors, but such indictments or present-
ments were to be certified to the police justice of the city, if 
.the city had one. This was an emergency act. · 
The new constitution then went into effect, county courts 
were abolished, and Acts 1904, Chapter 103, page 158, we 
find Section 4106 again changed, giving police justices, etc., 
_concurrent jurisdiction with the c-ircuit and corporation courts 
in certain misdemeanors, and then further provided : 
'' And except when it is otherwise specially provided shall 
have exclusive original jurisdiction for the trial of all other 
misdemeanor cases occurring within their jurisdiction.'' 
This aet was carried in the Code of 1904 and was amended 
in 1910 so as to give jurisdiction o"Y"er offenses arising out 
of city o·rdinances. .And then later 4106 was carried in the 
Code of 1936 as Section 4987, giving concurrent jurisdiction 
with the circuit courts and the corporation courts in all mis-
demeanor cases, with certain exceptions. 
26* *In the meantime, 1904, the General Assemblv cre-
ated a new crime-a misdemeanor, Acts 1904, page 208 .. 
This is the birth of what is now known as Section 1936 of the 
.Code. It provides : 
"That any person who shall without just cause desert or 
wilfully neglect to provide for the support of his wife or 
minor children in destitute or necessitous circumstances shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished," 
etc. 
- Section 2 of the act provides: 
'' The corporation or hustings courts of the cities and the 
circuit courts of· the counties shall have exclusive original 
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jurisdiction of all prosecutions and proceedings under this 
act.''. 
Observe this follows the abolition of the County Court un"" 
der the new constitution. Acts of 1915, Chapter 114, dealt 
with this question and passed an '' act making it a misde-
meanor for a husband to desert or neglect to provide for the 
support of his wife, or for a parent to desert or neglect to 
provide for the support of his child or children under t~e 
age of sixteen years'', prescribing the penalty therefor and 
making provision for the apprehension and punishment of 
persons convicted of non-support, and providing that persons 
convicted of non-support be sent to the convict road force in 
certain contingencies, providing for the taking of recogni-
zances and for the forfeiture and enforcement of said recog-
nizances, providing for the appointment of probation officers 
and prescribing their duties and powers, and making 
27• chiefs of police *and sheriffs probation officers in cer-
tain contingencies. This act says in Section 2: 
'' In cities where such court~ shall be established, the juven-
ile and domestic relations courts shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction in all cases arising· under this act.'' 
This is an elaborate act containing nine sect.ions, and in 
placing the exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases aris-
ing· under this act in the juvenile and domestic relations court, 
removed the trial of such cases from the circuit or corpora-
tion courts. This act was amended in 1918 and then expanded . 
into the present statute by the amended act of 19·22. So the 
expression '' exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases aris-
ing under this act'' was never intended to destroy any previ-
ous remedies in civil :(>rocMdings, but simply was placing the , 
jurisdiction of the trial of misdemeanors arising under the 
act. 
It will be observed that the prosecution must be predicated 
upon the wife being in destitute or necessitous circumstances. 
It does not provide for a case where a husband deserts his 
wife and fails t~ support her, a duty he owed under the com-
mon law reg·ardless of whether she was in destitute or neces-
sitous cireumstances. , 
Again it will be observed that desertion alo~e of the wife 
without just cause is made a crime by this act. 
To wilfully neglect or refuse to provide for the sup-
28* port •and maintenance of the wife is also made a crime. 
Clearly the object and purpose of the statute in de-
fining these as crimes is to preyent those in destitute or ne-
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Qe,!:lsitous circumstances from b~coming a charge on the stf\tf'. 
,¥est Virginia has dealt with this question in Clifton v. Clif-
ton ( 1919), 98 S. E. 72, it being a case exactly like the one 
a.t bar. In addition to the question as to whether or not 
equity inherently had jurisdiction, we find: 
- "The defendants insist, however, that Chapter 51 of the 
Acti::; of 1917, Code Supplement 1918, Sections 5179a-5179h, 
being an act rela,ting to the desertion and non-support of wife 
and children and providing punishment therefor, turnishes 
the deserted wife a means of complete and adequate redress, 
a.nd that therefore a court of equity will not entertain a bill 
for that purpose. Even though that act does furnish a means 
by which a court of law can grant relief in such cases, does 
that deprive courts of equity of the jurisdiction which they 
theretofore possessed f It seems to be quite well settled that 
where equity has jurisdiction of a ~ubject matter, the fact 
that the legislature by statute gives a remedy at law there-
for does not deprive tho equity courts of their jurisdiction 
unless the· statute so expressly declares. The jurisdiction 
thereafter will be exercised concurrently. 
qBut is the remedy provided by Chapter 51 of the Acts of 
1917 adequate to afford relief! That statute makes it a 
criminal offense for a husband to desert and fail to provide 
for his deserted wife and children. The primary purpos~ of 
the act was to prevent such deserted and abandoned persons 
from beco:rnhig charg·es upon the public. It is the protection 
of the public that is· sought by the act. This obligation of 
a hi1,sband to s·upport and main ta.in, his ivif e eaists whether 
she i.<; destit'ltte or whether she is not, while the act referred 
to only gives the remedy in cases of destitution.'' 
28a * *If the decisiou of the Trial Court in this case be 
the law of this State, then Mrs. Heflin (if she be in 
d(lstitute or necessitous circumstances) would have two reme-
dies: one, the criminal prosecution; the other, a suit for 
divorce. But if she is not in destitute, or necessitous cir-
c.umstances ( aiid she is not; and the bill does not so allege, 
though the writte11 opinion of the Trial Court misquotes), 
then she cannot go into the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
Oourt in the criminal case, because she is not in destitute or 
necessitous circumstances. Hence, she is deprived of that 
remedy, thm~ leaving her only one, to-wit: a suit for divorce--
the very thing that the policy of the law says should not be en-
CQuraged. 
Surely the Court of last resort in Virginia will not estab-
lish such a doctrine, which is repulsive to the higher senses 
of domestic relations. 
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29* *Is 1wt this exactly the situation in the case at bad 
IIere we have a wife who h~s been a.bandoned by her 
husband. She is unde1· the common law entitled tQ be sup ... 
ported by him. He has ample property, large holdings of re.al 
estate, probably a quarter of a million dollar~ in value,. but 
the juvenile and domestic reltaions court under the Virginia 
statute is poweress to touch one penny .of that property. It 
can put the accused in jail if arrested and convicted, he can 
be dealt with for contempt, but if be violates the cQurt order, 
nothing can be done towards maintaining and supporting the· 
wife, except the county or city may be required to pay as much 
as $1.00 a day, and if the accused is worked on the highway, 
the highway department may pay as much as $1.00 per day, 
there being no children, and not to exceed $1.75 in either event 
if there be children, 
And further, if the accused, owning all this property, dis-
appears ancl is not arrested, we have the remarkable situa ... 
tion of a quarter of a million dollars of real estate within the 
jurisdiction of the court and yet the juvenile and domestic 
relations court is powerless to do anything· with this prop-
erty and the deserted wife will perish for lack of re.lief being 
afforded, a red-uctio ad absiirdwm. The West Virginia court 
makes a point of this. It says : 
30* *'' Then it only provides for convicting the husband 
of a criminal offence, putting· him in jail and working 
him on the road. There is no means provided in it for se-
questering any of his estate in case he has any and applying it 
to the maintenance of the wife. This power is possessed by 
courts of equity~ ,Should he fail or refuse to comply with 
the court's decreQ and his ability to perform it is shown, not 
only may bis person be · seized and he be punished for dis-
obedience of the order, but his property may likewise be seized 
and applied to satisfy the decree in favor of the deserted wife. 
So we see that the remedy provided by Chapter 51 of the 
A.cts of 1917 is primarily for the benefit of the state. It does 
not"' look so much to the protection of the deserted wife, and 
Clifton v. Clifton, 98 S. E~ 72. 
is entirely inadequate and insufficient to confet• that complete 
and full relief which can be afforded by a coui't of equ\ty. '' 
A.t this point we mig·ht add that if the tria! court'ij QOn-
clusions are correct, then Mr. Heflin in this case could be suf-
ficiently obstinate as to refuse to comply with the order of 
the jn.venile and domestic relations court. Thereupon he would 
be put in jail, a fine imposed, or wQrked on the public high~ 
way. He would be convicted of a crime, something his wife 
does not desire, bas not requested, and in addition thereto 
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would bring humiliation and embarrassment upon her. And 
as- to h~r condition, she would perish for lack of support. On 
the other hand, if Mr. Heflin disappears, the- juvenile and 
domestic relations court is powerless to enforce any order 
it might enter, and though vast holdings of property might 
be under the deserted wife's eyes, not one dollar could be 
touched in order that she 1;eceive nourishment. 
31 * *TheseJhings all go to show that the legislature never 
intended~ by the enactment of the statutes 1936, 1937 and 
1937a, et seq.,-!<> rob equity of its jurisdiction, but simply 
passed the statutes to cover those cases· primarily to keep 
the deserted one; then and there being in destitute or neces-
f;,itous circumstances, from becoming a charge upon-the state, 
and further to provide a remedy for those who have no prop-
erty, but the clefendant has an earning capacity; and to deal 
with him criminally in compelling him _to maintain and sup-
port those who are in his dependents. 
Petitioner's counsel offers amends for this prolonged dis-
cussion, but it is an important case; its ultimate ends are far 
reaching. · 
It is submitted that in this case the plaintiff has three 
remedies, provided she be in destitute or necessitous circum-
stances: 
1-:A suit in equity for maintenace and support, which is 
inherent and founded upon sense and justice ; 
2-To go into the divorce court and obtain maintenance. 
This is inherent in a court of equity, incidental to the divorce, 
and is statutory. 
3-She can go into the criminal court-the Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations Court having jurisdiction, if she be in 
destitute or necessitous circumstances; but in that event, if 
the court decides in favor of the accused, she is helples. The 
. husband can get the appeal if dissatisfied with that *de-
32• cision, but none is afforded her. 
If she is nQt in destitute or necessitous circumstances, 
then she has two remedies-The court of equity; or the di-
vorce court-and not one remedy only, which is the result of 
the Trial Court's decision. 
Therefore, petitioner prays that this honorable court may 
award her an appeal and su,per.<;edeas; that the action of the 
Trial Court may be reviewed; that the decree and judgment 
of May 1, 1940, may be reversed, set aside and annulled ; and 
that the petitioner may be awarded the prayer set out in her 
petition filed in the Corporation Court on March 8, 1940. 
Petitioner here states that she adopts this petition as her 
Laura Heflin v. E. G. Heflin. ·23 
opening Brief in the event an appeal and supersedeas is 
awarded her. 
Petitioner further states that a copy of this petition was 
presented to F. M. Chichester, Esquire, of Counsel of record 
for the Defendant, on the 20th day of 1\fay, 1940. 
And your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
LAURA HEFLIN. 
WM. W. BUTZNER, Counsel. 
I, Wm. W. Butzner, an Attorney at Law practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, certify that in my 
opinion the judgment. an(l ruling of the Corporation Court of 
Fredericksburg, Virginia, in this case, should be reviewed. 
Received May 21, 1940. 
WM. W. B_UTZ'NER, 
Attorney at Law. 
M. B. W ATT.S. 
Appeal and supersedeas allowed. Bond $200.00. 
H. W. H. 
July 9, 1940. 
Received July 10, 1940. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
Be it remembered that in the Clerk's Office of the Cor-
poration Court for the City of ,Fredericksburg a.t the First 
November Rules, 1927, came the Complaina.nt, Laura Heflin 
and filed her bill of complaint against E. G. Heflin, which is 
in the following words, to-wit: 
page 2 ~ COPY. 
In the Corporation Court of Fredericksburg, Virginia. 
Laura Heflin, Plaintiff, 
v. 
~]. G. Heflin, Defendant. 
24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
BILL. 
To the Honorable Judge of said Court: 
Humbly complaining· your oratrix, Laura Heflin, respect-
fully represents: 
That she is a resident of the City of Fredel'icksburg, Vir-
ginia, and has been all of her life; that likewise the said E. G. 
Heflin is a resident of Fredericksburg, Virginia, and has 
·been such all of his life; that on, to-wit: October 8, 1906, in 
the City of Washington, D. C., your oratrix and the said E. G. 
Heflin were married and from that time up until seven or 
eig·ht years ago they lived and cohabited together as husband 
and wife in the City of Fredericksburg; that since seven or 
eight years ago they have not lived and co-habited as husband 
and wife, but resided in the same home; that there lived in 
the same home the mother of the said E. G. Heflin, and also 
a sister; that often your oratrix wanted to live with her hus-
band in a home separate and apart from her mother-in-law 
and sister-in-law, but saw that such an arrangement might 
bring about some friction in the family of your oratrix's hus-
band and therefore she did not pursue this wish, but did her 
part to make him a good wife and have his home attractive 
and pleasing; that some seven or eight years ago 
page 3 ~ your oratrix's said husband severed all marital re-
lations without any reason or justification therefor, 
yet your oratrix and her said husband lived in the same borne. 
That some years ago the said E. G. Heflin purchased a 
handsome home on Lower Main Street, from :Mrs. D. D. 
Wheeler, and took title and had the deed recorded in his 
mother's name, it being Mrs. Alice Heflin. Your oratrix 
charges that she holds the property as trustee for the benefit 
of the said E. G. Heflin, he having paid the purchase monev 
therefor, and that the said home is very valuable, worth prob-
ably $25,000, or $30,000. 
That the said E. G. Heflin has been quite a successful busi-
ness man, being an architect and builder, and has consider-
able property standing in his name, among which properties 
are the following in Fredericksburg, Virginia : 
The Heflin Apartments, valued at 
Knoxana Apartments, valued at 
Fitzgerald property, valued at 
Charlotte St. property, valued at · 
BouleYard residence, valued at 
Goolrick property, valued at 
$70,000 or more; 
32,000 or more ; 
10,000 or more ; 
8,000 or more ; 
4,000 or more ; 
6,500 or more ; 
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Bradley property, valued at 
The mill lots, valued at 
Structures thereon, yalued at 
Machinery & equipment therein, valued at 
Personal property, yalued at 
25 
7,500 or mo.re; 
2,500 or more; 
2,000 or more ; 
2,500 or more ; 
60,000 or more. 
And other property, real and personal., is owned b.y the said 
E. G. Heflin. 
Your oratrix further represents that she helped him in the 
past twenty-one years to earn and accumulate these hold· 
ings and during these many years she has only drawn a little 
pin. money in the way of sp,mding change for incidentals, 
clothi1:1g and food; that she helped her said husband in. the 
maintenance and upkeep of the home, and that she has no 
property of any consequence in her own name. 
page 4 ~ Your oratrix would further represent that the 
said E. G. Heflin for a number of years has aban-
doned and deserted your oratrix, and that he has become in-
fatuated by other women, associated with them in such a way 
and under circumstances as to be extremely embarrassing to 
your oratrix; that your oratrix has tried to bear this without 
complaint so as not to annoy her said husband, though in do-
ing so has suffered humiliation, mental anguish, and cruelty 
_inflicted upon her by her said husband in such conduct. 
Your oratrix represents that about six weeks ago her said 
husband stated to your oratrix that he wanted a divorce and 
intended having· one, but your oratrix then and there gave her 
husband to understand and be informed that she herself de-
sired no divorce, which seemed to irritate her said husband, 
and following this he became abusive to your oratrix, calling 
her an '' old buzzy'', or similar expressions, and ordered her 
out of the home, stating· that she was· not wanted there. At 
that time the mother of the said E. G. Heflin indicated that 
she did not wish your oratrix to leave, thongh ordered to do 
so by her husband, and the ref ore your oratrix remained, 
thoug·h unhappy as she was, in this home, then occupied by her 
mother-in-law and sister-in-law, and by your oratrix and her 
said husband; that about two weeks ago, on, to-wit: Sep-
tember 27, 1927, the said E. G. Heflin stated to your oratrix 
that either he, himself, or your oratrix would have to get out 
and later the mother of the said E. G. Heflin told your. ora-
trix that either one or the other would have to leave and get 
out, and that she herself could not do without her son, the 
said E. G. Heflin, and that she wanted him to remain: there-
fore, your oratrix was ordered to leave and get out; and 
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. thereupon your oratrix was compelled to leave and 
page 5 ~ forced away from this home and to seek shelter else-
where; that she went to the home of brother E. 
D. King and her niece and now is with her niece, Pauline 
. Stoffreg~n, in the City of Fredericksb'qrg; that she is without 
means of- securing maintenance, food, clothing and shelter, 
and now .is dependent upon the charity of her kin; that the 
said E. ·G. lleflin has given her nothing since prior to Sep-
tember 27, 1927, at which time he laid $5.00 on the table for 
your oratrix; that· your oratrix does not desire a divorce, 
because she believes it will result in the ruin and destruction 
of her husband; that he appears to be completely.dominated 
by and under the influence and control of one Bur-
ion, a wbman of bad reputation, livin~ in Fredericksburg, Vir-
ginia, in the Knoxana Apartments, 1t being the property of 
the said E. G. Heflin; that the said E. G. Heflin appears to 
be willing to throw away all pride in his reputation and stand-
ing in _order to be with this woman; that your oratrix has 
reason to believe that he is sharing his earnings and holding 
with this woman; that your oratrix further alleges that she 
herself is without maintenance and support, and is without 
means or funds by which to employ and pay counsel for rep.:. 
resenting her in this predicament, and that she is entitled to 
have the same furnished and afforded her by her said hus-
band, who to all intents and purposes seems to have aban-
doned your oratrix. . · 
page 6 ~ Now in consideration whereof and inasmuch as 
your Oratrix is remediless in the premises save in 
a court of equity where matters of this kind are properly 
cognizable and relievable she prays that she may file this her 
bill; that the said E. G. Heflin may be made party defendant 
hereto and be required to answer the same, though answer un-
der oath is hereby expressly waived; that process issue 
ag~inst him; that your oratrix may have this court direct 
the said E. G. Heflin to pay unto her suitable, reasonable and 
appropriate maintenace for a home, food, clothing, and for the 
necessaries of life, and that she is entitled to have such com-
mensurat~ with her standing in the community in which she 
lives and commensurate with the financial status of her said 
husband; that she be allowed not only maintenance and ali-
mony, but that she also be allowed sufficient funds with which 
to maintain this suit and to· employ and compensate coun~el 
for representing her in these proceedings, and that your ora-
trix may be granted all such other, further and more general 
relief in the premises as the nature of her case may require; 
or to equity shall seem meet and proper. And your oratrix 
will ever pray, etc. 
LAURA HEFLIN. 
------------, 
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page 7 ~ And be it further remembered that at a Corpora-
tion Court within and for the City of Fredericksburg 
on November 26, 1927, the following order was entered which 
is in the folowing words and figures, to-wit: 
page 8 ~ Corporation Court of the City of Fredericksburg, 
Va., November 26, 1927. 
Heflin, Laura, 
v. 
Heflin, E. G. 
The plaintiff having filed her bill and process having been 
issued, executed and returned as to the defendant, returnable 
to the 1st November, 1927, Rules, and notice having been 
served upon the defendant that motion for maintenance and 
support and counsl fees pendente lite, this day would be 
made. 
And the Court having heard evidence on said motion, and 
the Court having considered the same. 
And was argued by Counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof the Court doth adjudge,. or-
der and decree that the defendant do pay to the Plaintiff, 
pendente lite, monthly the sum of $250.00 beginning of the) 
first month Sept. 27, 1927, the date of the showing in the biU, 
the Plaintiff had to leave the home of the defendant. Said 
payments from Sept. 27, 1927, to this date Nov. 26, 1927, shall 
be paid within five days from the entry of this order, and the 
payments thereafter shall be paid on or before the 27th of 
each and every month, until the further order of this Court. 
And it is further ordered that within ten days from the 
entry of this order the defendant ;E. G. Heflin do pay to Wm. 
W. Butzner the sum of $350.00 on account of Counsel fees 
to enable the Plaintiff to prosecute her suit herein. 
page 9 ~ And be it further remembered that at a Corpora-
tion Court held within and for the Citv of Fred-
ericksburg on the 8th day of March, 1940, an order was en-
tered in the following words and :figu_res, to-wit: 
page 10 ~ Virginia : 
In the Corporation Court of Fredericksburg. 
Laura Heflin 
v. 
E. G. Heflin. 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
ORDER. 
This day Laura Heflin, by leave of court, filed her peti-
tion in the case pending in this court under style of Laura 
Heflin v. E. G. Heflin, and the Clerk of this Court is directed 
to forthwith issue process on said petition against the said 
E. G. Heflin, returnable to Second March 1940 Rules. 
page 11 ~ Virginia : 
.. In the Corporation Court of Fredericksburg. 
Laura Heflin 
v. 
E. G. Heflin. 
PETITION. 
I I 
To the Honorable Frederick W. Coleman, Judge of the said 
Court: 
IN EQUITY. 
Humbly complaining, your Petitioner, Laura Heflin, re-
spectfully represents: 
That she has a judgment in her favor against E. G. Heflin 
for maintenance and support, being dated the 26th day of 
November, 1927, and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Cor-
poration Court of Fredericksburg, Virginia, November 26, 
1927, in Judgment Docket 2, page 95, by which the said E. G. 
Heflin was required to pay $250.00 a month to your petitioner; 
that said judgment is still in force and effect; 
That the said E .. G. Heflin for a time complied with said 
order, but then became lax until quite an accumulation of 
monthly payments were in arrear. Petitioner, through the 
efforts of counsel, made collections from time to time until 
in 1.937 he again g·ot in arrear, and on or about January 14, 
1938, he was in arrear $3,000.00, and that the said H. G. 
Heflin made a payment of $500.00, reducing the amount then 
due and in arrear to $2,500.00. 
That petitioner again through her. counsel took up this 
matter with the said E. H. Heflin and with Mr. F. M. Chi-
chester, his Attorney, and on January 20, 1938, petitioner's 
counsel received a promise and assurance from the 
page 12 ~ said E. G. Heflin, through his Counsel, by which 
the said E. G. Heflin promised to pay $500.00 cash 
out of his rent collections, $1,000.00 cash as soon as Dr. Dodd 
paid for certain building that was done for him by the said 
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E. G. Heflin., and the balance in arrear to be paid $250.00 per 
inonth until the $2,500.00 was satisfied, with interest, which 
latter payments were to be in addition to tlJ_e regular stipends 
of $250.00 a month; that this assurance was by letter from 
the said F. M. Chichester., in which he says·: 
'' Peck Heflin (E. G. Heflin) asked me to make the fol-
lowing promise of settlement., which I hope will be satisfactory 
and which, if not carried out, I will not make any further re-
quests for indulgence on your part since you have been very 
considerate in this matter.'' 
.And further in said letter he says : 
"I am writing this to you in preference to making oral 
statement, in order that you may have in writing exactly what 
he promises to do and for the further reason that if he does 
not live up to this promise I shall not again make any prom-
ises for him." 
With these assurances Petitioner's Counsel replied on 
January 27, 1938, as follows: 
"In connection with this matter I have your letter of Janu-
ary 20, in which you state that Mr. Heflin makes a promise 
to liquidate the over due payments as follows: 
$ 500.00 deposit, which has already been placed to the credit 
of Mrs. Heflin ; 
$ 500.00 to be paid out of February rents between the first 
and fifteenth; 
$1,000.00 cash out of Dr. Dodd 's building. 
and $250.00 a month until the · balance is liquidated, and at 
the same time Mr. Heflin to pay the monthly stipends. I have 
talked with Mrs. Heflin and while she wants her money, she 
again is willing to cooperate in this matter. She has expressed 
a willingness to receive the following: 
$ 500.00 already deposited, 
$ 500.00 to be paid between February 1 and 15, 
$1,000.00 out of the Dodd matter, provided that is paid in 
30 days, 
and the balance at the rate of $250.00 a mouth until liquidated, 
at the same time Mr. Heflin to pay the montlhy stipends for 
1938 promptly, beginning with January, 1938, $250.00 and 
each month thereafter promptly. Again there must be added 
interest on the monthly payments for 1937." 
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page 13 ~ And on- January 31 your Petitioner's Counsel 
received a communication from Mr. Heflin's At-
torney, as follo~i;. ... 
"Your letter received in regard to the above matter and 
will say that you correctly stated the proposition, which is 
satisfactory to Mr. Heflin. Mr. Heflin hopes to be able to take 
care of the whole matter on or before February 15th. If he 
does not he will follow out the proposition as laid down.'' 
. Th.at on Febraury 14th Petitioner received two 
checks from Mr. Chichester, Attorney for Mr. 
Heflin, one for $1,000.00, the other for $500.00, 
making 
On April 4, 1938, another check for 
On May 21, 1938, another check 
Which, with the $500.00 paid on January 14, 1938, 
makes a total _of 
which liquidated the amount of $3,000.00 in ar-
rear during the year 1937, except the accrued 
interest, which amounted to about 
There is due your-Petitioner for the year 1938 
and for the year 1939 
and three months of 1940, to :March 










Petitioner further represents that the said E. G. Heflin 
owns large holdings of real estate in Fredericksburg, Vir-
ginia, and large holding·s of personal property; that there 
stands in his name the following parcels of real estate, lo-
cated in Fredericksburg,· Virginia, and adjacent territory: 
901 National Boulevard, Lot 24, Blk 128D, valued $ 2,875.00 
401-2-3 Commerce ·St., Lots 128, 131 Blk. 81, valued 19,000.00 
407-9 Commerce St., Lot 129, Blk 81, valued 9,205.00 
607-9 Sophia St., Lots 1, 2, Blk. 10, valued 6,448.00 
307-9 Sophia St., Lot 273, Blk. 7, valued 2,000.00 
311 Sophia St., valued 500.00 
700-2 Prince Edward St., Lot 402, Blk 97, valued 33,375.00 
505 Charlotte St., Lot 402, Blk 97, valued 4,260.00 
507 -Charlotte St., Lot 402, Blk 97, valued 4,000.00 
509 Charlotte St., Lot 402, Blk 97, valued 4,000.00 
511 Charlotte St., Lot 406, Blk 97, valued 4,000.00 
513 Charlotte St., Lot 406, Blk 97, valued 4,000.00 
213 Main St., Lots 253, 263, Blk 53, valued 10,000.00 
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Commerce St. Lots 10; 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 Blk C 
(FR Co), valued · 3,390.00 
600 Spotswood St., Lot 80, Blk 120, valued 3,980.00 
800-4 Cornell .St., Lot 11, Blk 146, valued 12,050.00 
:Mortimer Ave. Lot 11, Blk 146 (2 Bl. A) valued 540.00 
Sylvan~a A.ve. Lot 10, Blk. 146 (5, 6, 7, 8, Bl. 
C) F. R. Co., valued 1,074.00 · 
Sylvania A.ve. Lot 10, Blk. 146 (8, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, Blk B, F. R. Co.), valued 2,485.00 
That the said E. G. Heflin became incorporated, 
page 14 ~ by which he operated under the name of E. G. 
Heflin Co., Inc.; that he owus the stock in this com-
pany, which has large assets; that the said E. G. Heflin owns 
and operates the Stratford Hotel which yields him large ~urns 
of money; 
That the said E. G. Heflin has become obstinate, dislikes his 
wife, and in his mind is determined to prevent her from exist-
ing, if possible; that he is perfectly willing that she be in need 
for food, shelter and clothing in order to carry out his deter-
mination. 
Petitioner claims the aforesaid sum of 
Interest on the 1938 accumulations 
For 1939 interest on $3,000.00 
Also for 1939 interest on '39 acc.umulations 
Interest on $6,000.00 for· 1940, 3 mo. 
Making a total, principal and interest of 







That said amount is a lien on the property of the sai<l 
E. G. Heflin. 
That the said E. G. Heflin, in addition to the rentals for 
his real estate, takes in large sums of money; his earning 
capacity is quite extensive; that he has been using these funds 
for other purposes and neglecting the payments on the judg-
ment due your petiitoner and has neglected to comply with the 
order of the court requiring him to make said payments 
monthly. 
That the rents, issues and profits from the said real estate, 
within the next five years will pay said judgment and also pa.y 
the said monthly allowances; that your petitioner is entitle<l 
to have this court appoint a receiver to collect the rentals·when 
and as the same fall due on said real estate and apply the same 
to your petitioner's judgment and the amounts due her. 
That your petitioner is entitled to have the Court deal with 
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the said E. C. Heflin for contempt of court in failing to com-
ply with the afore said order of the said court, dated 
November 26, 1927, which is now in full force and 
page 15 ~ effect. 
Your petitioner is without means of support and 
is now and has been dependent on friends, who aid her in ob-
taining food, shelter and clothing. 
Now in consideration whereof and inasmuch as petitioner 
is remediless in the premises, save ~n a court of equity where 
matters of this kind are properly cognizable and relievable 
she prays that she may file this her petition in the said suit 
pending in the Corporation Court of Fredericksburg, Vir-
ginia, under the style of Laura Heflin v. E. G. Heflin; that 
the said E. G. Heflin may be made party defendant hereto and 
be required to answer this petition, though answer under oath 
is hereby expressly waived; that process issue against him; 
tha.t petitioner may have a receiver appointed, or proper 
officer of this court designated to collect the rentals due the 
said E. G. Heflin on the various and sundry parcels of real 
estate owned by him and apply' the proceeds towards the pay-
ment of your petitioner's judgment; that all proper accounts 
be taken and references had as the nature of the case re-
quires; that your petitioner may be allowed a reasonable at-
torney's fee for Wm. W. Butzner, her Attorney in this mat~ 
ter; that your petitioner may have the real estate of the said 
E. G. Heflin subjected to the payment of the said indebted-
ness; thnt the said E·. G. Heflin may be dealt with by the Court 
for contempt in not complying with its ord< ,r; that he be re-
quired to pay all amounts in arrear due your petitioner on 
said judgment and to pay promptly when and as the same 
fall due the monthly stipends heretofore by this court directed 
to be paid to her; and that she may have all such other, fur-
ther and more general relief in the premises as the nature of 
her case may require or to equity shall seem meet and proper. 
And petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
WM. V-l. BUTZNER, p. q. 
LAURA HEFLIN, 
by Counsel. 
page 16 ~ In the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court 
of the City of Fredericksburg on March 20, 1940, 
came the Respondent, E.G. Heflin, and filed his written motion 
which is in the following words and figures, to-wit: 
page 17 ~ 
Virginia: 
Laura Heflin v. E. G. Heflin. 
COPY. 
In the Corporation Court of the City of Fredericksburg. 
Laura Heflin 
v. 
E. G. Heflin. 
MOTION. 
33 
The respondent, E. G. Heflin, by counsel, now comes and 
files this his motion in writing,'moving that the bill filed by 
the complainant in this case on the 27th day of October, 1927; 
the petition filed by the complainant in this suit on the 8th day 
of March, 1940, be dismissed, and the order entered herein 
on the 28th day of November, 1927, be vacated and annulled 
on the ground that the Court had neither active nor potential 
jurisdiction of the matters and allegations contained in tl1e 
bill of complaint, for the following reasons, to-wit: 
(1)-That a court of equity has no jurisdiction of the case 
as set forth in the bill of complaint because· the exclusive 
original jurisdiction of such matters was at the time vm~ted 
in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the City of 
Fredericksburg and the exclusive original jurisdiction of such 
cases was for a long period prior to the filing of complainant's 
bill and continuo:usly since that time vested in the Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations Court of; the City of Fredericksburg, .Vir-
ginia. Said Court having been in existence during all of this 
period as will be seen from a certified copy of the appointment 
of the Honorable J. M. H. Willis as Judge of said Court, which 
appointment was duly made on the 21st day of February, 1923, 
a certified copy of his appointment being filed here-
page 18 ~ with and asked to be considered along with this 
motion. Also a certified copy of the order appoint-
ing his successor which is filed herewith and asked to be con-
sidered along with this motion. 
(2)-That a Court of equity was without either potential or 
active jurisdiction to award alimony pendente lite or counsel 
fees and that the order entered on the 26th day of November, 
1927, is therefore void. 
(3)-That the rcmedic~ provided by statute (See Code, 
Sections 1936, 1937, 1937 a, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 
1944, 1944a, and Sections 1953a, et sec.) are adequate and com-
plete for all Domestic relation cases except those involving 
divorces. 
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(4)-That Domestic Relations Courts were created for the 
purpose of hearing and deciding all cases arising out of domes..: 
tic relations and the exclusive original jurisdiction of all such 
cases was accordingly vested in said Courts by statute. 
This respondent therefore moves that the bill of complaint 
be dismissed ··and all · decrees and orders entered pursuant 
thereto be vacated and annulled. · 
F. M. CHICHESTER, 
S. B. COLEMAN, p. d. 
(Signed) E. G. HEFLIN, 
By Counsel. 




Court met pursuant to adjournment. 
Present and presiding, Hon. John T. Goolrick, Judge ,J. :M:. 
H. Willis, Judge Juvenile Court. 
Under and in accordance with the provisions of an Act of 
the General Assembly of Virginia, Chapter 482, Act of 1922, 
J. M. H. Willis, the Police Justice of this City and as such, 
a Justice of the Peace, is hereby appointed as Judge of the 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the term of six 
years and until his successor has b_een appointed and qualified. 
WHEREUPON came the said J. M. H. Willis and qualified 
as such Judge of the Juvenile Court by taking and subscribing 
the usual oaths. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. H. WII.J.i.IS, Clerk. 
· Laura Heflin v. E. G. Heflin. 35. 
page 20 } CORPORATION - COURT OF FREDERICKS-
BURG ON THURSDAY, THE NINETEENTH 
DAY OF JANUARY IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD ONE 
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGH'l.1, 
PRESENT HONORABLE FREDERICK V{. COLEMAN, 
JUDGE OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. 
Re Appointment Henry Dannehl, Judge Juvenile Court. 
J. M. H. Willis, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Re~ 
lations Court of the City of Fredericksburg, Virgi.nin, having 
tendered his resignation as such to the Court, which resig-
nation is accepted; 
It is ordered. that Henry Da.nnehl be, and he is, hereby ap-
pointed Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court 
within and for the City of Fredericksburg, Va., and thereupon 
the said Henry Dannehl appeared in Court and qualified as 
such by taking and subscribing the oath of office prescribed 
by law. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. H. WILLIS, Clerk. 
page 21 } At a Corporation Court held within the City of 
Fredericksburg. on May 1, 1940, in Laura Heflin, 
Complainant, v. E. G. Heflin, Respondent, a decree was en-
tered ~vhich is in the following words and figures, to-wit: 
page 22 } Virginia : 
In the Corporation Oourt of the City of Fredericksburg, 
May 1, 1940. 
Laura Heflin,. Complainant, 
v. 
E. G. Heflin, Respondent. 
This cause came on again this- day to be further heard on 
the papers formerly read and on the petition heretofore filed 
by the complainant, and on the written motion of the re-
spondent to vacate the decree entered herein on the 26th day 
of November, 1927, and to dismiss this proceeding. 
And was argued by counsel : 
Upon consideration whereof the Court being of the opini011, 
for reasons set forth in a written opinion and made a part 
hereof, that it has no jurisdiction in the premises, doth so 
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decide, adjudge, order and decree, and the Court doth further 
adjudge, order and decree that the decree entered herein on 
the 22nd day of November, 1927, be and the same is hereby 
vacated and annulled, and that the judgment granted by the 
decree-, November 22nd, 1927, and docketed in Judgment Lien 
Docket No. 2, p. 95, in the Clerk's Office of this Court under 
the style of Laura Heflin v. E. G. Heflin, be and same is here-
by cancelled and annulled, and that the Clerk of this Court 
do make suitable reference to this decree on the margin of the 
Judgment Lien Docket where said judgment is docketed. This 
proceeding.is ordered dismissed at the cost of the complain-
ant. 
It is ordered that execution on this judgment be suspended 
for a period of sixty days to enable the complainant to apply 
for an appeal herefrom, if she may be so advised, provided 
that on or before -the 30th day of May, 1940, the complainant 
execute before the Clerk of this Court a suspending bond with 
~pproved security in the sum of two hundred dollars ($200.00) 
payable and conditioned as the law directs. 
page 23 ~ Virginia : 
In the Corporation Court of the City of Fredericksburg. 
Laura Heflin, Complainant, 
v. 
E.G. Heflin, Respondent. 
OPINION OF THE COURT. 
The complainant filed her bill of complaint against the 
respondent in this court at the First November Rules, 1927, 
praying that she be allowed alimony, etc. The bill does not 
pray for a divorce, but is a bill simply asking that alimony 
~ncl coun8el fees be allo-wed. The main allegation of the bilJ 
IS: 
" • * * Your oratrix would further represent that the said 
E. G. Heflin for a number of years has abandoned and de-
serted your oratrix, and that he has become infatuated by 
other women, associated with them in such a way and under 
cirmimstances as to be extremely. embarrassin~ to your 
oratrix; that your oratrix has tried to bear this without com-
plaint so as not to annoy her said hubsand, t,hough in doing 
so has suffered humiliation, mental anguish and cruelty in-
flicted upon her by her said husband in such conduct. Your 
oratrix represents that about six weeks ago her said husband 
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stated to your oratrix that he wanted a. divorce and intended 
having one, but your oratrix then and there gave him to under-
stand and be informed that she herself desired no divorce, 
which seeme~ to irritate her said husband, and following this 
l1e became abusive to your oratrix calling her an old huzzy 
and ordered her out of the home, stating that she was not 
wanted there. That her said husband deserted her she being 
in destitute and necessitous circumstances.'' · 
The bill was duly matured at Rules and upon hearing iu 
this court on the 26th day of November, 1927, the Court en-
tered an order directing the respondent to pay unto the com-
plainant the sum of $250.00 per month, and fur-
page 24 ~ ther directed that Wm. vV. Butzner be paid the sum 
of $350.00 as counsel for the complainant. The 
respondent paid this monthly allowance for some time and 
then would allow it to accumulate until it became a very con-
siderable amount. However, he would :finally catch up in the 
payments until within the past two years, or more, the re-
spondent has declined to make further payments. Thereupon, 
tlie complainant filed her petition in this cause against the 
respondent, setting forth his failure to comply with the terms 
of said order and asking that he be dealt with for contempt. 
Process was duly issued on the petition and duly returned. 
Thereupon the respondent filed his written motion to dismiss 
said suit and to vacate the said decree requiring him to pay 
alimony for the following reasons, to-wit: 
'' 1. That a court of equity has no jurisdiction as set forth 
in the bill of complaint because the exclusive original juris-. 
diction of such matters was at the time vested in the juvenile 
and domestic relations court of the City of Fredericksburg, 
and the exclusive original jurisdiction of such cases was for a 
long period prior to the filing of complainant's bill and con-
tinuously since that time vested in the juvenile and domestic 
relations court of the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia. Such 
court having been in existence during all of this period, as 
will be seen from a certified copy of the appointment of the 
Hon. J. M. H. Willis as judge of said court, which appoint-
ment was made on the 21st day of February, 1923, a certified 
copy of his a-ppointment. being filed herewith and asked to be . 
considered along with this motion. Also a certified copy of 
the order appointing his successor, which is filed herewith, 
and asked to be considered along with this motion. 
2. That a court of equity was without either potential or 
active -jurisdiction to award alimony pendente lite or counsel 
fees, and that the order entered on the 26th day of November, 
1927, is therefore void. 
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3. That the remedies provided by statute (see Code, Sec-
tions 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1944a, 
and Sections 1953a, et seq.) are adequate and c.9mplete for 
all domestic relation cases, except those involving divorce. 
4. That domestic relation courts were created for the pur-
pose of hearing and deciding all cases arising, out of domestic 
relations and the exclusive original jurisdiction of all such 
cases was acc_ordingly vested in said courts by statute.'' 
page 25 ~ The contention of the respondent, briefly stated, 
is that ~11 eQnity court cannot entertain a bill re-
quiring the payment of alimony without the prayer for di-
vorce. This is the bone of contention ... That a deserted wife 
has the option either to proceed against the delinquent hus-
band in the juvenile and dome~tic relations court, under 
Sections 1936 and 1937a, under C11apter 80 of the Code, or she 
may proceed in the circuit or corporation courts to obtain a 
divorce and hav·e alimony allowed incidentally. These two 
sections of the Code above referred to, read: 
"1936. Any husband who shall, without just cause, desert 
or wilfully neglect or refuse or fail to provide for the sup-
port and maintenance of his wife, and any parent who shall 
desert or wilfully neglect or refuse or fail to provide for 
the support and maintenance of his or her male child under 
the age of sixteen years, female child under the age of seven-
teen years, or child of either sex of whatever age who is crip-
pled, or otherwise incapacitated for earning a living, ( such 
wife, child or children being then and there in destitute or 
necessitous circumstances), shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,_ 
and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not 
exceeding five hundred dollars, or in the case of a husband or 
father, be sentenced to the State convict road force at hard 
labor for a period of not less than ninety days or more than 
twelve months, or both, or in lieu of such fine being· imposed 
he or she may be required to suffer a forfeiture of an amount 
not exceeding-the sum of five hundred dollar-s and said fine or 
forfeiture may be directed by the court to be paid in whole or 
in part to the wife or to the guardian, curator, custodian or 
trustee of said minor child or children, or to some discreet 
person or responsible organization designated by the court 
to receive the same. * * * '' 
''1937a. Proceedings under this act shall be had in the cir-
cuit court of the counfo~s and before the police justices or 
corporation court of the cities; provided, however, that in 
cities and counties where such court shall be established, the 
juvenile and domestic relations court shall have exclusive 
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·original jurisdiction in all cases arising under this act, ex-
cept that any grand jury of any such corporation court may· 
indict for desertion and non-support in any case wherein de-
fendant is a fugitive from the State of ,Virginia, and any 
defendant, so indicted, presented and apprehended. * * ,)lo hus-
band deserts the wife, she being in destitute and necessitous 
circumstances, and refuses to provide for her.'' 
In fac.t, Section 1937a is in language so plain that the way-
fa ring man though he be unlearned need not err therein, says : 
''where such courts shall be established, the juvenile and 
domestic relations court shall have exclusive 
page 26 ~ original jurisdiction in all cases ai·ising under this 
act.'' How could this be made plainer f 
Even if it be conceded that a wife could file a bill in chan-
cery for alimony without asking for a divorce, upon the estab-
lishment of a juvenile and domestic relations court, would not 
equity be deprived of such jurisdiction f It is well settled, 
that where equity has jurisdiction and the same jurisdiction is 
·conferred on a court of law, equity is not deprived of juris-
diction unless the statute conferring the jurisdiction uses re-
strictive words depriving the chancery court of such jul'isdic--
tion. Can it be successfully contended that the Legislature 
in enacting 1937a did not use restrictive words with the in-
tent to deprive the equity court of this jurisdiction if it ever 
existed to entertain a bill for alimony when it said-" where 
such court shall be established, the juvenile and domestic re-
lations court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all 
cases arising under this act." , 
In Levy v. Davis, 115 V.a. 820, Judge Whittle said: 
'' Counsel for the defendant have drawn our attention to 
the remedy provided by section 2462, subdivision 2, of the 
Code, as furnishing an exclusive remedy in all cases where 
property.has been sold and title reserved in the seller. The 
remedy given by ~tatute is extremely valuable (Liquid 0.ar-
bonic Co. v. Whitehead, ante, p. 80, S. E. 104), but there is 
nothing in the enactment, express or implied, to indicate a 
purpose on the part of the legislature to abolish preexisting 
remedies in that class of cases; a.nd the rule on the subject 
has long been well settled, that '"'\Vhen a statute gives a new 
remedy, and contains no neg·ative, express or implied, of the 
old remedy, the new one provided by it is cumulative, and the 
party may elect between the two.' 2 Words and Phrases 1785; 
Booker's Exo'r. v. McRoberts, 1 Call. (5 Va.) 243; Burrett v. 
Davis, 24 Gratt. (65 Va.) 302; Filler v. Tyler, 91 Va. 458, 22 
S. E. 235; Kelly v. Lehigh, etc., Co., 98 Va. 405, 36 S. E. 511, 
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81 Am. St. Rep. 736; Barton's Chy. Pr. (2nd ed.) sec. 16; 
Sedg·wick, Constmction .of Stat.. and Const. La.w 75, 342; 
Sutherlin on Stat. Con~tr. sec. 399. 
A statute prescribing· a new remedy for an exist-
page 27 ~ ing right should never be construed to abolish a 
pre-existing remedy in the absence of express 
words or necessary implication.'' 
In Nichols v. Nichols, 169 Va. 40~, Judge Campbell said: 
"In Filler v. Tyler, 91 Va. 458, 22 S. E. 2~5, 237, it is said: 
'Courts of equity, having such jurisdiction before the enact-
ment of the statute «< * * still retain it although the statute 
may furnish a complete and adequate remedy at law. Courts 
of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, never lose it be-
cause jurisdiction of the same matters are given to law courts, 
unless the statute giving such jurisdiction uses prohibitory 
or restrictive words. 1 Barton's Ch. Pr. 60, 61.' See also 
Beverly v. Rhodes, 86 Va. 415, 10 S. E. 572; Shield v. Brown, 
166 Va. 596, 186 S. E. 33, 34; Hoge v. F·idetity Loa;n and Trust 
Co., 103 Va. 1, 48 S. E. 494." 
It is hardly possible to find in the English language words 
more prohibitory or restrictive than those used in Section 
1937a-where the Legislature said-"the juvenile and domes-
tic relations court where established shall have exclusive 
original jurisdiction of all cases arising under this act''. That 
which is a manifest certainty requires no demonstration. 
The language of Judge Campbell in Wright v. Wright, 164 · 
.Va. 245, not only sheds much light but is conclusive of the 
question here involved. In discussing the remedies of a de-
serted wife at p. 251, this distinguished jurist says: 
'' In order to determine the legal rights of the wife who 
had been deserted by the husband, it is necessary fo compare 
the remedies provided by. statute for her relief. 
Under the provisions of chapter 80 of the Code, a wife 
may file her petition alleging that her husband had, without 
just cause, deserted and wilfully neglected and refused to pro-
vide for her support, etc. Thereupon a warrant shall issue 
against the said husband. If, upon the trial, he is found 
g11ilty, he may be punished for a misdemeanor, as provided 
by section 1936 of the Code, or in the discretion of the juvenile 
and domestic relations; colll't, an order may be entered direct-
ing the defendant to pay a certain sum periodically for the 
support of the wife, under the provisions of section 1939. In 
the event of the defendant's failure to pay the amount directed 
he may be punished for contempt. 
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While in a technical sense the provisions of the 
page 28 r Code under chapter SQ may be criminal in form, in 
their practical effect they are compensatory pro-
visions and analogous to section 5107 of the Code, which pro-
vides for the maintenance of the wife during the pend ency of a 
suit for divorce. Under the provisions of both chapters of 
the Code, the court may direct payments to be made to the 
wife at stated periods and mav punish as for contempt upon 
failure so to do. .. 
It is thus seen that the wife has been afforded two distinct 
methods of compelling the delinquent husband- to provide foi· 
her support and maintenance. Having been afforded a choice 
of remedies, the wife must elect which remedy she will pur-
sue, as it is inconceivable that the legislature intended that she 
should have the right to pursue both remedies and thus make 
the husband pay twice for one delinquency. Appellant having 
made her election and having failed, in the hustings court, 
in her attack upon the judgment of the Nevada court, should 
she now by filing a suit for divorce be permitted to raise the 
que~tion of ]lP.r marital Rtatus ?" 
In the case of Commonwealth v. Boaze, reported in 165 Va. 
786, the facts were that Boaze was divorced from his wife 
and the children were given to Mrs. Boaze, and Boaze was 
directed to pay $10.00 per month for their support. Failing 
to do this under a rule he was sentenced to jail for ten da.ys. 
After serving this period of time in jail a warrant was issued 
from the juvenile and domestic relations court charging Boaze 
with failing to provide for their support; he was convicted and 
appealed to the Circuit Court of Campbell County which 
sustained the conviction. From this court he appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. In delivering the 
opinion of that court, Judge Holt, at p. 792, said: 
"In TYri_qht v. lVright, 164 Va. 245, 178 S.. J!j. 884, is this 
headnote supported by the text: 
'Wife, deserted by husband, must elect between her statu-
tory remedies for compelling him to provide for her support 
bY briug-iug desertion proceedings or divorce suit, in either 
of which court may direct husband to make payments to wife 
and punish him for contempt, if he fails to do so ( Code, 1919, 
seci,.. 1936, 1939, as amended; sec. 5107).' 
'' The court there in the course of its opinion said. 
'While in a techuic~l sense the provisions of the Code under · 
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chapter 80 .may be criminal in form, in their practical effect 
they are. compensatory provisions and analogous to section . 
5107 of the Code, which provides for the maintenance of the · 
wife during the pend ency of a suit for divorce. 
page 29 ~ Under the provisions of both chapters of the code, 
the coiut may direct payments to be made to the 
wife a stated periods and may punish as f 01· contempt upon 
failure so to do.' 
''The wife brought suit for divorce and secured a decree 
providing f9r .. the support of these infant children. That de-
cree the court -had ample power to enter,,Oocle, sec. 5111 (ai:; 
amended by Acts, 1927, Ex. Secs., ch. 85), and to change it to 
meet changing conditions. It had and has also ample power 
in contempt proceedings to enforce its order. The judgment 
in the instant case, so far as it provides for the support of 
these children, is substantially but an affirmation of what 
already had been done. Thls wlf e has elected to proceed 
under the decree and should abide by her election.'' 
"This case should be dismissed, and it is so ordered." 
Counsel for the complainant in his brief lays much stres:::. 
on the case of Al,mond v . .Alm,ond, 4th Rand~ 662, arguing 
from this case, that the supreme court of appeals has decided 
that an independent snit for. alimony might be filed in equity. 
to compel the husband to pay alimony, etc., to the wife with-
out praying for a divorce. This case does not so hold and I 
have been unable to find any case where the appellate court 
of the state has ever held that an independent suit may be 
filed in equity for alimony without praying for a divorce. It 
is true that the decision in the Almond case has been cited 
as authority that a deserted wife may file he·r bill in equity 
for alimony without praying· for a divorce. As a matter of 
fact the Almond case did not establish any such holding·. 
What was the holding of the supreme court of appeals i.n 
this noted Almond case! Judge Cavr, who delivered the opin-
ion at p. 662 said : 
· '' This is a bill filed by· Mrs. Almond, by E. Cox, ber next 
friend, against her husband for alimony. It states, that she 
brought him seven or eig·ht negroes, which have all been 
wasted by him in riot and drink; that her brother gave her 
a girl after her marriage, who has had three children; that 
her husband treated her with great cruelty, beating her in his 
drunken fits, which became so frequent and intolerable, that 
she was at length obliged· to leave him, and throw 
page 30 ~ l10rself upon the charity of her -son; that when she 
went, her husband told her to take her present 
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along, meaning the woman; that the woman and her ·children 
soon after joined her at her son's; that her husband though 
he had disclaimed any right in the property, came to her son's, 
took the children, and sold them out of the state; saying, at 
the time, that he left the mother at her free disposal; but, he 
has since recovered a judgment for her a.t law, which he will 
enforce, unless prevented. The bill prays, that the court will 
decree her a separate maintenance, that she may be quieted 
in the possession of the slave, and the judgment injoined.'' 
In disposing of the case Judge Carr at p. 666 said: 
'' n1e suit before us is not after a divorce, but a voluntary 
separation; if that may be called volwntary, which seems to 
have been forced upon the wife by the ill treatment. I be-
lieve that in practice, the County Courts, sitting as Court of 
Equity, have assumed the power of giving separate mainte-
nance in cases of separation; but, b:r what rule they have been 
regulated, I know not. The jurisdiction was sustained by 
the Chancellor of the Richmond Chancery Court, in Purcell 
v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & :M:unf. 507; and the reasoning of the Chan-
cellor on the joint of jurisdiction seems to me sound. If there 
be a _contract for separation, it is conceded on all hands, that 
equity might, in proper cases, enforce that contract. But, 
suppose a husband to turn his wife out of doors, or to treat 
her so cruelly that she can not possibly live with him; suppose 
him to persevere in refusing· to ~ake her back, or to provide 
a cent to feed and clothe her. Surely, in a civilized country, 
there must be some tribunal to which she may report. She 
cannot be out of the protection of the law; an outcast, de-
pendent on tl1e charity of the world, while her husband may 
have thousands, and she may have brought him all. I would~ 
in such cases, unquestionably, stretch out the arm of Chan-
cery, to save and protect her. 
But, assuming jurisdiction, I should be cautious to reg·u-
late it by the rules which have been established elsewhere. 
If the parties have made an agreement, that should be thn 
standard; if not, I would take the practice of the .Court in 
analogous cases. There has certainly been no contract hel'e. 
I find it laid down. that where a separation has taken place, 
and the wife sues for a support, if the husband, in his a.n- · 
swer, states that she left him of her own accord, that·he haR· 
offered to receive her, and is willing to receive and treat 
her well, the Court refuse the maintenance. In the ans,ver 
before us, there is an entire .willingness expressed, to. receive 
her back and treat her a.s a wife. But, though this be a 
general rule, there must be exc~ptions to it. Suppose it ful~y · 
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proved to the Court, that the husband ,vas in the constant 
habit of intoxication; that wbeu drunk, he was a madlllan, and 
his anger particularly pointed at his wife. Surely, the Court 
would not, because of the offer to take her back, refuse a sup-
port, and thus force her either to hazard her life, or to de-
pend on charity. I do not mean .to say that this is such a 
case; but, I put it to the test the principle. 
page 31 ~ I have considered the case thus much at large, 
because it is entirely new in this Court. There is 
a specific objection to the proceeding- here, on which I think 
the judgnient of the Court below must be sustained. The de-
mand is not for alimony, or maintenance generally; but, that 
a judgment wbic.h the husband has recovered for a specific 
piece of property, (a negro woman,) shall be injoined, and 
the wife quieted in the possession of the woman. Now, the 
claim of the wife for alimony is a personal claim on the hus-
band; she has no lien on any specific property, without an 
agreement. She can no more, therefore, ask the Court to as-
sign her this negro, or that tract of land, than a creditor of 
the husband could come into Court and ask such assignment; 
which we know, with out a particular lien, could not be done. 
Under this view of the case, I think the injunction was prop-
erly dissolved, and the bill dismissed.'' 
Certainly it cannot be contended with any degree of sin-
cerity that the Almond case established the principle that a 
court of equity will entertain a bill to compel the payment 
of alimony when a divorce is not prayed for. All that Judge 
Carr said. in reference to the payment of alimony was pure 
dictum, and certainly is no authority in the instant case. 
The case of Keyser v. Keyser, 108 Va. 730, has been cited 
by counsel for the complainant. An examination of this case 
will disclose that it sheds little if any light on the question 
here involved. Judge Keith, after citing· the cases of Almond 
v. Almond and Purcell v. Piircell, said: 
'' It is to be observed, however, that the cases cited from 
4 R.and. and from Henning & Munford, were decided at a 
time when courts had no jurisdiction to grant divorc-es, and 
when divorces could only be obtained by petition to the leg-
islature of the State. The better opinion may be, that since 
the courts have been authorized to gTant divorces, our statute 
law upon the subject is to be looked to as the sole fountain 
of jurisdiction over persons and their property with respect 
to allowance of alimony to be exercised in proceedings for 
divorce; and if that be true, then the remark of Judge Staples 
is also true, that those statutes only allow alimony as incident 
. to a decree for divorce." 
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So we have dictum again. 
Counsel for the complainant has argueci. at length the hold-
ing of the appellate court of this state in Bray. v. 
page 32 ~ La11-dergreen, 161 Va., p. 704, in which Judge Holt, 
in a very able and Ieng-thy opinion, reviews the sub-
ject of alimony. However, a careful consideration of this 
case will disclose that what was said by Judg·e Holt was pure 
dictum insofar as it states that equity may allow alimony on 
an independent bill filed for the purpose. The point at issue 
in that case, was whether or not a personal ju~oment could 
be entered against the defendant, who was proceeded ag-ainst 
upon an order of publication for divorce and alimony and 
certainly so far as a court of equity allowing alimony was 
concerned the discussion of the allowance of alimony in a 
court of equity upon a bill was certainly not in point, and 
while this opinion is interesting and instructiye, it is likewise 
pure dictum insofar as the allowance of alimony is concerned 
upon a bill in equity not praying for a divorce. 
Counsel for the complainant has laid much stress on the 
cases of·Lang v. Lang (W. Va.), 73 S. E. 716, and Clifton v. 
Clifton (W. Va.), 98 S. E. 72. Upon an examination of these 
cases, it ·will be seen that the criminal statute of West Vir-
ginia referred to is in many particulars unlike the Virginia 
statute. The West Virginia statute is a criminal statute pure 
and simple, while in a technical sense the provisions of ,Chap-
ter 80, Virginia Code, may be criminal in form in their prac-
tical effect, they are compensatory provisions and analogous 
to Section 5107 of the Code of Virginia providing for the wife 
during the pendency of a suit for divorce. The differences 
between these statutes are very pronounced. 
This question came before Judge Beverley T. Crump of 
the Law and Equity Court of the City of· Richmond in the 
case of Powell v. Powell, and in disposing of it in a written 
opinion Judge Crump said: 
page 38 ~ "VVithout passing upon the general question as 
to the jurisdiction of a court of equity over such 
a case by reason of its inherent jurisdiction, I haye reached 
the conclusion that the legislature has provided, in the Act 
·appearing in Act 1922 p. 842, a complete and adequate remedy 
at Jaw and enacted a special judicial tribunal to administer it. 
This act is carried into Michie 's Annotated Code of 1924 as 
sections 1936 to 1944-a, inclusive. A careful reading and 
consideration of the entire act and all its provisions convinces 
me that it was intended to meet just such a case as that pre-
sented by the bill in this case, and that by its terms the juris-
diction of a court of equity to enforce the legal duty of sup-
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port resting upon the husband is excluded.' The first statute 
of this characte1· was enacted in 1915, and may have been 
passed in order to meet, by a statutory remedy, the doubt 
cast by Judge Keith in the case of I( eyser v. I( eyser, 108 Va. 
730 upon the power of a court of equity to afford relief. The 
original act\vas amended in 1918 and then expanded into the 
present statute by the amended act of 1922. The act pro-
vides for the relief of a deserted wife in '' destitute or neces-
sitous circumstances''. As to the meaning of these word~ 
J udg·e Keith said in Burton's Case, 109 Va. 800, a prosecution 
under an act of 1904 allowing an indictment by a grand jury 
for the offense "As to what shall be considered sufficient 
proof of the offense must depend upon the circumstances of 
each case. There is no fixed standard by which the law un-
dertakes to define what shall constitute 'destitute' and 'ne-
cessitous circumstances'. It may vary with the conditions 
to which the parties have been ac.customed. The necessaries 
of one person may be the luxuries of another, reared in and 
habituated to different surroundings. It is safest, the ref ore, 
to leave it to the jury to say whether or not the facts estab-
lished the charge. '' 
In Draper v. Com., 115 Va. 941, a prosecution under the 
same statute, the court practically holds that where the non-
support is not total, evidence as to the circumstances of the 
parties and the capacity of the husband to pay more than the 
amounts he w~s in the habit of contributing would be ad-
missible. Owing· to these prior constructions of the statute 
the domestic relation~ court has as wide a scope as a court. 
of equity in adjudging what is just and right and can afford 
a far more efficacious remedy. For this reason doubtless the 
Act of 1922 makes that remedy exclusive and deprives other 
courts of jurisdiction. The bill in this case states just such a 
case as mig·bt be embodied in a petition or sworn complaint 
_ to the domestic relations court. It is true the pro-
page 34} ceeding there is instituted by a process in the na-
ture of a criminal warrant, and the jurisdiction 
of the court may be said to be criminal in character, but the 
relief is not confined to punishment of the delinquent husband. 
The court is given the power, in. fae.t, to substitute for th<> 
punishment an order requiring the husband to give the wife 
adequate support, and in addition to the methods allowed to 
secure compliance with the order the court is e:x"J)ressly given 
power to ''punish for violation of such order as for con-
·tempt" in case of an appeal. Within the exterior frame of 
criminal procedure there is to be found very complete and 
exacting en~orcernent of the civil right. As was said by the 
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court in Butler v. C oni., 132 Va. 609, which came up from a 
corporation court to which an ~ppea] had been taken from a 
domestic relations· court upon a prosecution under the act of 
1915, these statutes ''were uot intended to change the com-
mon law, with respect to the duty of a father to maintain and 
support his infant children, but merely to more effectually 
enforce the legal duty". It is to ·be observed that in the pres-
ent statute (Sec. 1937) it is provided that, except as specially 
allowed therein, '' no warrant of arrest shall issue against 
any person ·com.in~ within the terms of this act, but all pro-
ceedings shall be mstituted upon petition as aforesaid". 
It is undoubtedly true that, in those States in which it has 
been held that courts of equity have jurisdiction in the ab-
sence of an adequate remedy at law to enforce support of 
the wife, the great weight of authority is to the effect that 
a statute merely intended to punish a husband for a failure 
to furnish support does not deprive the ;equity court of juris-
diction. But the Virginia statute is not of such a restricted 
character. In sections 1938 and 1939 provision is made in 
quite an elaborate manner for the entering of orders re-
quiring periodical payments to· the wife by the 
page 35 ~ husband both before and after trial, just as would 
be done in a chancery cause, and to modify the 
:final order at any time. It might very well be open to doubt 
whether a court of equity would have power, after a final de-
cree ·fixing the payments, to alter the terms of the decree 
subsequent to the expiration of the term at which it was en-
tered. It rather seems that the divorce court has no such 
power over the final decree in a divorce case. Lile 's ·Eq. Pl. 
& Pr. p. 415-418. Jurisdiction to entertain a petition by a 
wife under the act of 1922 is in· circuit courts of the counties, 
and in juvenile and domestic relations courts in the larger 
cities; and those courts have exclusive jurisdiction, except in 
cities having a police justice and no juvenile and domestic re-
lations court. 
'' Whatever may be the effect of the statutes in other states, 
I am constrained to the conclusion that in Virginia there ex-
ists an adequate remedy for the complaint made in the bill 
against the defendant, and therefore the demurrer must be 
sustained.'' · 
"B. T. C. · . 
"Feb. 15, 1926." 
Th~s question came before Judg·e Frank T. Sutton, Jr., of 
the Law an~ E<{uitt ~o.~~t P!lrt}I·o~ _t~e Ci~tr_of Richmond in 
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the case of K eek v. K eek. Judge Sutton, in· disposing of the . 
question in a written opinion, said: 
'' The bill in this case charge~ circumstances which show 
the wife of the defendant to be hi destitute and necessitous 
circumstances. She does not seek a divorce but seeks only 
to have the court compel her husband to provide her with a 
reasonable support. 
Section 1936 of the Code makes ample provision for com-
pelling· the husband of a wife in such circumstances to fur-
nish support, and Section 19'37 a of the Code provides '' * * * 
that in cities and counties ·where such courts shall be estab-
lished, the juvonile and domestic relations court shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases arising 
pag·e 36 ~ under this act, * * • '' with certain exceptions not 
relevant to this case. 
As the City of Ridhmond has a juvenile and domestic re-
lations court, that court has exclusive jurisdiction in this case, 
and the demurrer of the defendant should be sustained.'' 
\:Vhen we boil this matter down to its final analysis, we 
are forced to the conclusion that the Legislature intended by 
enacting· Chapter 80 to provide, and did provide, that if a 
,vife desires to obtain maintenance and support from a de-
linquent husband and is unwilling to ask for a divorce, that 
the juvenile and domestic relations court is given exclusive 
original jurisdiction, and that this was the intent and purpose 
of the Legislature when it said in Section 1937a that "where 
such court· shall be established, the juvenile and domestic re-
lations court sha1l have exclusive original jurisdiction in all 
cases arising under this act". 
Under the holdings by Justice Campbell iu the ,vright caso 
and Justice Holt in the Boaze case, sitpra, there remains no 
longer any doubt as to the proper construction to be placed 
on the lang·uage that '' the juvenile and domestic relations 
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases 
arising under this act". These holdmg·s are binding on this 
court, and until those eases are reversed, this court must fol-
low them. When these holdings are considered along· with 
the decision in the Almond case, supra, it is quite manifest 
that the chancery court never had inherent jurisdiction to en-
tertain a hill for alimony without praying for a divorce, and 
even if, by the ,vildest stretch of imagfoation, it could be held 
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deprived of it by Section 1937a of Chapter 80 of the 
page 37 ~ Code. 
The conclusion is, the ref ore, reached that the 
written moti~n of the respondent must be sustained and this 
case dismised. It is so ordered. 
FREDERICR W. COLE·MAN. 
Fredericksburg, May 1st, 1940. 
pag·e 38 ~ Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of the City of 
Fredericksburg on the 9th day of May, 11940. 
I, M. II. vVillis, 'Clerk of the said Court do certify that the 
f oreg·oing is a true copy of the record in the case of Laura 
Heflin v. E. G. Heflin now pending in this Court. I further 
certify that said record was not made up and completed until 
the parties were given due notice thereof. 
Teste: 
M. H. WILLIS, Clerk. 
A Copy-Testc : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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